I'm a research fellow at the Forethought Foundation in Oxford, where most of my research concerns ethical and empirical issues around the long-term future. I'm also an affiliated researcher at the Institute for Future Studies in Stockholm. Recently, I completed my PhD in philosophy at the London School of Economics. Before coming to LSE, I received a BPhil from Oxford and a BA from Lund University. My philosophical work is mainly in epistemology (esp. formal), decision theory, and ethics. My CV is here. You can e-mail me at firstname.lastname@example.org.
- The Evidentialist's Wager.
forthcoming in The Journal of Philosophy (w/ Will MacAskill, Caspar Oesterheld, Carl Shulman, and Johannes Treutlein).
- Imprecise Bayesianism and Global Belief Inertia.
British Journal for the Philosophy of Science 69(4):1205-1230, 2018.
- Trust and the Value of Overconfidence.
Synthese 191(13):1991-2007, 2014 (w/ Erik J. Olsson).
- Norms of Assertion and Communication in Social Networks.
Synthese 190(13):2557-2571, 2013 (w/ Erik J. Olsson).
- Do Computer Simulations Support the Argument from Disagreement?
Synthese 190(8):1437-1454, 2013 (w/ Erik J. Olsson).
- Bayesian Variations: Essays on the Structure, Object, and Dynamics of Credence.
PhD Thesis, London School of Economics, 2018.